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NEW ZEALAND: A MARKET TO WATCH? 
Government-subsidised ‘nationwide’ FTTH network 
– 75% of residences to have access to 100Mbps by 2018 
Delivered by Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
– Government funds $1.5b of $4 to $6 billion project 
– ‘capital recycling’ model 
Criterion for participating:  
– full structural separation of network and retail operations 
– including copper network if incumbent is a partner 
EARLY SUCCESS? 
“One of the rewarding things about our UFB programme 
has been the high levels of international praise for how 
our roll-out is progressing, particularly compared to 
some of the other international programmes”   
              Communications Minister Amy Adams, 8 August 2013 
– 20% of network built 
– but less than 3% uptake by premises passed 
– “by comparison, in Singapore uptake was about 2 per cent 
when 20 per cent of the network was built and in the UK, 
uptake was about 3 per cent when 24 per cent of the 
network was built”  
WHAT MS ADAMS DIDN’T SAY 
An industry in near complete disarray 
– impasse as draft regulatory decision on future copper 
access price (proposed 30% decrease for unbundled 
bitstream) threatens business case for fibre investment 
– collapse in the share price of (separated) copper 
incumbent Chorus 
– international capital flight from Chorus (from 70% to 
around 40% of shareholding in less than five months) 
– threatened government override of regulatory decision  
– consumer (and voter) backlash at denial of (possible) 
lower copper prices if government intervention occurs 
 
HOW DID THIS COME ABOUT? 
2008 election 
– Government fibre investment a key plank of (then) 
opposition policy 
Rationale for government intervention 
– ‘missing market’ for investment? 
• 2007 NGN undertaking between Chorus and Government  
– all communities with 500 or more lines would have access to 20Mbps 
by December 2011 
– keeping up with the neighbours? 
• 2007 Australian election – incoming government pledged substantial 
investment in telecommunications 
 
‘JUST BUILD THE NETWORK’ 
No clear competition policy intention articulated for 
building fibre network 
– to accelerate infrastructure competition? 
– to accelerate substitution of copper with fibre access? 
No coherent regulatory framework to govern industry 
– Telecommunications Commission to regulate copper 
network to promote competition on copper (with no 
reference to Fibre market developments 
– Crown Fibre Holdings to use contractual undertakings with 
fibre partners to regulate fibre market 
 
REGULATORY SILOS: FIBRE 
“Crown Fibre Holdings monitors compliance with the terms of 
the Ultra-Fast Broadband Initiative while the network is being 
built. This includes oversight of price caps, products, network 
construction and operation (especially quality assurance testing), 
as well as the Government’s investment in shares, financial 
instruments and governance.” 
» http://www.crownfibre.govt.nz/publications/regulatory/  
“The Commerce Commission monitors and enforces the deeds 
of undertakings made by the government’s Ultra-Fast 
Broadband partners, as well as other aspects of the 
Telecommunications Act 2001” 
» Ibid  
 
REGULATORY SILOS: COPPER 
“We have no statutory role in promoting or protecting 
fibre,” says Gale. “Our task in this larger project is just 
to fix the price of copper-based services. Retail service 
providers will then compete on whatever network they 
find most profitable.” 
   Telecommunications Commissioner 
» http://computerworld.co.nz/news.nsf/news/new-wholesale-price-for-
access-to-copper-network  
 
LETTING THE PPP CONTRACTS 
Bid prices based on equalised copper and fibre prices for 
equivalent services when bids called in early 2010 
Non-Chorus bidders 
– no existing market participant apart from the incumbent bid 
– price bid unequivocally subsidised network build cost only 
Chorus 
–  bid price will include compensation for regulatory takings 
for forced early closure of copper network as a consequence 
of government fibre investment, plus build costs 
– will differ depending upon how much of the addressable 
market Chorus expects to get contracts for 
‘AND BUILD IT AS CHEAPLY AS POSSIBLE’ 
Chorus had absolute cost advantage (FTTx network) 
Crown Fibre let contracts in two stages to ensure 
Chorus ‘sharpened its pencil’ 
– substantial share of contracts (18%) let pre-emptively early 
to non-Chorus bidder to signal willingness to strand Chorus 
FTTx investments if tendered price not ‘right’ 
– but led to incoherent competitive outcome, e.g. 
• Chorus got contract for fibre in Auckland (population 1.5 million) 
=> no infrastructure competition between copper and fibre 
• WEL networks got contract for Hawera (population 11,500) => 
inevitable indefinite copper-fibre infrastructure competition 
• Chorus did NOT get the contract for Christchurch => post-
earthquake rebuild has Chorus reinstating copper connections 
THE COMPETITIVE REALITY 
At least 6 different market structures 
– areas where government fibre will not be deployed (30% 
of market) – copper must endure indefinitely 
• with and without other effectively competitive infrastructure 
(satellite, LTE, etc) 
– fibre areas (70% of market)  
• Chorus supplies copper and fibre => short term infrastructure 
competition, cut rapid substitution and decommissioning copper 
(70% of the fibre market, 50% of broadband market 
• Chorus supplies copper and competitor supplies fibre => enduring 
infrastructure competition 
– both of above, with and without infrastructure 
competition (cable, rival fibre, LTE etc)  
 
REGULATORY RIGIDITY 
Changes to Regulatory framework enacted June 2011 
– sole change to address structural separation 
• new pricing method needed for retail-minus priced products 
– one single nationwide price for all Chorus copper connections 
No change made to govern either 
– inevitable infrastructure competition 
• in the interim in the areas where Chorus provides both networks 
• in the long run, where Chorus copper competes with non-Chorus fibre 
– incentives for ongoing ‘ladder of investment’ in the 30% of the 
market where fibre would not be deployed 
 
 
ONE COPPER PRICE TO RULE THEM ALL? 
Which of the six markets is the single price set to 
calibrate? 
– one single nationwide copper price will be ‘wrong’ for at 
least 5 of the 6 markets 
December 3 2012 
– Commission proposes internationally-benchmarked 
copper access price  
• 30% lower than 2010 prices used when setting fibre bids 
• unilateral breach of  good faith w.r.t. PPP contracts 
– will delay fibre uptake rate => non-Chorus firms will not meet rollout 
targets as capital will not ‘recycle’ as fast as expected 
– devalues Chorus’ compensation for ‘regulatory takings’ 
 
GOVERNMENT BREACHED PPP TERMS 
Chorus, other investors legitimately believed the 
government would not allow copper prices to deviate 
from early 2010 levels 
Regulator’s actions have led to government breaching 
PPP agreements 
Government could have intervened immediately 
– threatened, but no action until February 8 2013 
– ‘action’ turned out to be ‘inaction’ 
• a regulatory review, which was not begun until August 2013 
– result was collapse in Chorus share price, foreign capital 
flight 
• investing in NZ ‘too hard/too risky’ 
• Government ‘can’t be trusted’ 
 
PROPOSED ‘REVIEW SOLUTION’ 
Set (single, nationwide) copper price using 2010 fibre bid 
price as the cost of an equivalent modern network as per 
TSLRIC 
But which fibre price? 
Chorus price (including compensation for early closure)? 
– ‘wrong’ price for non-Chorus fibre areas (too high) 
Non-Chorus price  
– ‘wrong’ price for Chorus fibre areas (too low) 
Any fibre price 
– ‘wrong’ for non-fibre areas as crowds out entrant copper 
investment incentives 
WHAT CAN BE DONE NOW? 
More patching  of ‘bad existing regulation’ not an option 
– must start with a clean slate  
– governing today’s markets, not yesterday’s or ‘tomorrow’s’ 
– but forward-looking so adaptable to changing circumstances 
Separate geographic markets regulated according to 
current competitive realities 
– incentives to achieve government policy objectives can be 
calibrated differently for different competitive environments 
Government buyout of all private investments so 
taxpayers, not investors, bear risks of (poor) government 
policy-making (the ‘Australian’ solution)??? 
WHAT CAN EUROPE LEARN? 
State Aid rules make an NZ-type outcome less likely 
– but any state subsidy alters incentives 
Any State investment must be addressing a specific 
market ‘problem’ 
– clarity of objective, ensuring consistency of competitive 
interaction and policy objectives are non-negotiable’ 
• investing just to ‘get a fibre network’ is not sufficient  
When regulating for infrastructure competition 
– separate geographic markets are unavoidable if appropriate 
incentives are to be applied across all networks and all 
operators 
 
WHAT CAN EUROPE LEARN (cont)? 
Path dependency influences regulatory frameworks 
– risk of ‘frame blindness’ must be overcome 
Regulators are ultimate custodians of sector strategy 
– may be strongly influenced by integrated incumbent firms 
– structural separation disincentives sector participants from 
taking responsibility for sector strategy 
• missing market for co-ordination 
• increases responsibility for regulators, policy-makers for 
determining direction 
Beware of doing deals with governments!  
THANK YOU 
